bad印度积贮所

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A bad bank would be a start—but only that—towards cleaning up India’s
ailing financial system

不佳的银行将是三个从头,但只是如此 手艺荡涤印度衰弱的经济系统

If you owe a bank a hundred dollars, it is your problem. If you owe a
hundred million, it is the bank’s problem. If you are one of many
tycoons borrowing billions to finance dud firms, it is the government’s
problem.

假设你欠一家银行一百日币,那是您的难题。
纵然你欠了二个亿,那是银行的标题。
纵然您是借了数10亿日币为无效公司融通资金的多数要员之一,这是政坛的题材。

That is roughly the situation India finds itself in today. Its
state-owned banks extended credit to companies that are now unable to
repay. Like the firms they have injudiciously lent to, many banks are
barely solvent. Almost 17% of all loans are estimated to be
non-performing;state-controlled banks are trading at a steep discount to
book value. After years of denial, India’s government seems belatedly to
have grasped the threat to the wider economy. Plans are being floated to
create a “bad bank” that would house banks’ dud loans, leaving the
original lenders in better shape. The idea is a good one, but it must be
properly implemented and is only the starting-point for broader
reforms.

那大约就是印度今日所处的事态。
其国有银行提供信用贷款给一部分商厦,近日却无力偿还。
像他们不愿意放贷的那些公司同样,繁多银行近乎未有偿付工夫了。
全体贷款中大概一7%的被测度为不良;
国家说了算的银行交易价格远远小于其账面价值。
经过多年否认之后,印度政党就像才慢腾腾地体味到它对越来越宽泛的经济构成威逼。
创建多少个“坏账银行”的方案正在发泄出来。它将存放在银行的不良贷款,使得原贷款人情形更佳。
这些主见不错,但它必须获得确切推行,而且也只是越来越宽广改正的起源。

The bad-loan mess has been years in the making. India skirted the
financial bust of 2007-08, but then complacency ensued. Banks went on to
finance large-scale projects—anything from mines and roads to power
plants and steel mills— which often ended in disappointment. Over 40% of
loans made to corporate India are stuck in firms unable to repay even
the interest on them, according to Credit Suisse, a bank. The result is
a “twin balance-sheet problem”, whereby both banks and firms are
financially overstretched. Corporate credit is shrinking for the first
time in two decades

坏账麻烦多年来向来在转移之中。印度躲避了二〇〇六 –
0八年的金融风险,但随之就洋洋自得。银行持续为大型项目融通资金,从矿山到公路,从发电厂到钢铁厂,而这一个项目屡次以令人适得其反的措施了却。依照瑞士联邦信用贷款银行的数码,向印度公司提供的借款Chinese Football Association Super League过40%陷入在依旧心中无数归还利息的铺面。结果是1个“双生产资料产负债表难题”,即银行和供销合作社同时在财务上过度扩展。集团信用在二10年来第二回衰退。

In an ideal world, the banks would write down the value of the loans.
The resulting losses would require fresh funds from shareholders. India
is far from that ideal. It takes over four years to foreclose on a loan
(a newish bankruptcy law should help). The government is the main
shareholder of the worst affected banks, and has been reluctant to
inject more cash. Bankers themselves are afraid to deal with loans
pragmatically, because that often gets mistaken for cronyism.

在理想世界里,银行会下跌账面价值。
因而发生的损失将索要股东注入新的资金财产。 但印度远不是那么美丽。
它要求四年时间来打消抵押品赎回权(新的倒闭法应该有匡助)。
政坛是受影响最要紧的银行的机要股东,而且不乐意注入更加多的新款。
银行家们团结害怕如实地地惩治贷款,因为如此做平常被误以为是任人唯亲。

Clean energy needed

急需干净财富

The solution so far has been to pretend nothing much is wrong. The banks
have rolled bad loans over, hoping that growth would eventually make
things right. This is a poor strategy, as anyone who followed Japan in
the 1990s and Italy since the financial crisis well knows. It is only a
matter of time before the banks’ difficulties derail India’s economic
prospects. Hence talk of setting up a bad bank to sort out the mess.

时至明天的缓慢解决方案就是装模做样没犯什么错。银行将不良贷款贻误缓,希望加强最后会使事态转好。那不是三个能干的计谋,因为任何追踪过壹九8八年份的扶桑和金融危害以来意大利共和国显示的人都应该很好精晓。银行之困使孔雀之国的经济前景脱离正常的轨道只是2个时光难题。由此,探究设立八个坏账银行以解决乱局。

Bad banks have been used with success in the past—in Sweden in the
1990s, for example, and in Spain in recent years. But if they are to
work, candour and cash are both needed. The candour is required to
assign a realistic value to banks’ soured loans. Indian lenders must be
compelled, and quickly, to sell loans to the bad bank even at a hefty
discount to face value, no matter how much it may wound their pride or
dent their profits. That is where the cash comes in. When those
write-downs eat up capital, the state must be ready to make up the
shortfall even if it means borrowing more to do so.

坏账银行有过成功的判例。举例20世纪90年间在瑞典王国,以及近来在西班牙(Reino de España)。但只要他们要负有成就,公正和现金都不可缺少。公正意味着要为银行呆坏账给定二个有血有肉的估值。必须强迫印度贷款人快捷,向坏账银行销售不良贷款,就算相对面值给予比一点都不小的优化。无论那会给她们的荣光带来多大的重伤,也随便多大程度上减弱他们的毛利。那正是现金的来源。当这个减值吞噬资本之时,国家必须计划弥补足收入的差额额,纵然那意味着借款越多。

That is only a start, however. A bad bank could resolve this crisis. But
to make future ones less likely, broader reforms are needed. Some are
under way. Political interference (loans to a minister’s buddy, say) and
dysfunctional governance (many bank bosses get only one-year stints at
the helm, for example) are less of a problem than they once were. But
lenders should not be instruments of the state. Private investors should
be allowed to play a bigger role in cleaned-up banks, even if that means
the government has to give up majority control.

但那只是是一个方始。坏账银行可以消除这一场风险。不过为了今后不再犯类似的错误,供给开始展览更广阔的更动。一些情势正在拉动中。政治干预(比方给秘书长的相知贷款)和法力失调的治理(比如,繁多银行CEO只可以掌权一年)相比较以前不再是1个主题材料。但贷款人不应成为国家的工具。应当允许私人投资者在清理后的银行体系中表述越来越大的效劳,就算那代表政坛务必扬弃超越八分之四调整权。

India’s “promoters”, as the founders and owners of big businesses are
known, also need to be reined in further. Tycoons have the upper hand in
negotiations with their lenders because they know that red tape,
patronage and antiquated legal systems make it all but impossible to
seize the assets of defaulting firms. In effect, they cannot be replaced
at the helm. Resolving this imbalance would make it more likely that dud
loans are a headache for banks and borrowers, not for the finance
minister. It is good that  policymakers appear to be waking up to the
magnitude of India’s banking problem. Whether they appreciate the scale
of the solution is less clear

印度的“带动者”,远近盛名的大公司创办人和全体者,也急需更为被掌握控制。商业巨头们在与他们的贷款人商谈中占上风,因为她们清楚官样小说,尊崇和过时的法兰西网球国际比赛(French Open)制度使得尚未也许赢得违背规定公司的资本。实际上,它们不能够在掌舵处被替换。解决那种不平衡后,不良贷款将令银行和借款人头痛不已,而不是财政根据地长的。政策制定者就像正在开采到印度银行难点的不得了程度,那是好的上边。他们是还是不是知道消除方案的规模还不是可怜明了。

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