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A bad bank would be a start—but only that—towards cleaning up India’s
ailing financial system

倒霉的银行将是三个从头,但无非如此 才能荡涤印度衰弱的财政和经济系统

If you owe a bank a hundred dollars, it is your problem. If you owe a
hundred million, it is the bank’s problem. If you are one of many
tycoons borrowing billions to finance dud firms, it is the government’s
problem.

365bet手机app下载,假定你欠一家银行一百美元,那是您的题材。
假使您欠了1个亿,那是银行的标题。
假诺你是借了数10亿欧元为无效公司融通资金的不少要员之1,这是政党的题材。

That is roughly the situation India finds itself in today. Its
state-owned banks extended credit to companies that are now unable to
repay. Like the firms they have injudiciously lent to, many banks are
barely solvent. Almost 17% of all loans are estimated to be
non-performing;state-controlled banks are trading at a steep discount to
book value. After years of denial, India’s government seems belatedly to
have grasped the threat to the wider economy. Plans are being floated to
create a “bad bank” that would house banks’ dud loans, leaving the
original lenders in better shape. The idea is a good one, but it must be
properly implemented and is only the starting-point for broader
reforms.

那大概正是印度明日所处的事态。
其国有银行提供信贷给1部分公司,方今却无力还款。
像他们不愿意发放贷款的那几个公司一样,许多银行近乎未有偿付能力了。
全体贷款中大约1七%的被测度为不良;
国家说了算的银行交易价格远远小于其账面价值。
经过多年否认之后,印度政坛就像是才慢腾腾地体味到它对越来越宽泛的经济构成威逼。
创造三个“坏账银行”的方案正在发泄出来。它将存放在银行的不良贷款,使得原贷款人景况更佳。
这几个想法不错,但它必须取得适当履行,而且也只是更广大改善的源点。

The bad-loan mess has been years in the making. India skirted the
financial bust of 2007-08, but then complacency ensued. Banks went on to
finance large-scale projects—anything from mines and roads to power
plants and steel mills— which often ended in disappointment. Over 40% of
loans made to corporate India are stuck in firms unable to repay even
the interest on them, according to Credit Suisse, a bank. The result is
a “twin balance-sheet problem”, whereby both banks and firms are
financially overstretched. Corporate credit is shrinking for the first
time in two decades

坏账麻烦多年来直接在扭转之中。印度躲过了200柒 –
08年的金融风险,但随后就依心像意。银行持续为大型项目融通资金,从矿山到公路,从发电厂到钢铁厂,而那个种类屡次以令人失望的格局收场。依据瑞士联邦信用贷款银行的数额,向印度公司提供的放债中中国足球球组织一级联赛越40%深陷在依旧惊惶失措偿还利息的集团。结果是三个“双生产资料产负债表难题”,即银行和商行同时在财务上过于扩展。公司信用在二10年来第三遍衰退。

In an ideal world, the banks would write down the value of the loans.
The resulting losses would require fresh funds from shareholders. India
is far from that ideal. It takes over four years to foreclose on a loan
(a newish bankruptcy law should help). The government is the main
shareholder of the worst affected banks, and has been reluctant to
inject more cash. Bankers themselves are afraid to deal with loans
pragmatically, because that often gets mistaken for cronyism.

在优异世界里,银行会稳中有降账面价值。
由此发生的损失将索要股东注入新的本金。 但印度远不是那么美好。
它要求4年时间来废除抵押品赎回权(新的破产法应该有帮带)。
政党是受影响最沉痛的银行的基本点股东,而且不愿意注入越多的新一款。
银行家们融洽害怕如实地地收十贷款,因为如此做日常被误认为是任人唯亲。

Clean energy needed

须求净化能源

The solution so far has been to pretend nothing much is wrong. The banks
have rolled bad loans over, hoping that growth would eventually make
things right. This is a poor strategy, as anyone who followed Japan in
the 1990s and Italy since the financial crisis well knows. It is only a
matter of time before the banks’ difficulties derail India’s economic
prospects. Hence talk of setting up a bad bank to sort out the mess.

从那之后的缓解方案就是装腔作势没犯什么错。银行将不良贷款拖延缓,希望进步最后会使事态转好。这不是1个得力的国策,因为任何跟踪过1九八9年份的东瀛和金融危害以来意国呈现的人都应该很好驾驭。银行之困使印度的经济前景脱离平常的守则只是叁个小时难题。因而,探讨设立3个坏账银行以消除乱局。

Bad banks have been used with success in the past—in Sweden in the
1990s, for example, and in Spain in recent years. But if they are to
work, candour and cash are both needed. The candour is required to
assign a realistic value to banks’ soured loans. Indian lenders must be
compelled, and quickly, to sell loans to the bad bank even at a hefty
discount to face value, no matter how much it may wound their pride or
dent their profits. That is where the cash comes in. When those
write-downs eat up capital, the state must be ready to make up the
shortfall even if it means borrowing more to do so.

坏账银行有过成功的先例。例如20世纪90年间在瑞典王国,以及方今在西班牙(Spain)。但倘使他们要具有成就,公正和现金都不能缺少。公正意味着要为银行呆坏账给定七个有血有肉的估值。必须强迫印度贷款人快捷,向坏账银行出售不良贷款,固然相对面值给予非常的大的优胜。无论那会给她们的荣光带来多大的加害,也随便多大程度上减弱他们的创收。那正是现金的来源于。当那个减值吞噬资本之时,国家必须准备弥补足收入的差额额,固然那象征借款越多。

That is only a start, however. A bad bank could resolve this crisis. But
to make future ones less likely, broader reforms are needed. Some are
under way. Political interference (loans to a minister’s buddy, say) and
dysfunctional governance (many bank bosses get only one-year stints at
the helm, for example) are less of a problem than they once were. But
lenders should not be instruments of the state. Private investors should
be allowed to play a bigger role in cleaned-up banks, even if that means
the government has to give up majority control.

但那不过是三个伊始。坏账银行能够化解该场风险。然而为了未来不再犯类似的不当,必要展开更广大的立异。壹些情势正在拉动中。政治干预(比如给司长的挚友贷款)和成效失调的治水(例如,许多银行总老板只好掌权一年)相比较从前不再是1个题材。但贷款人不应成为国家的工具。应当允许私人投资者在清理后的银行连串中发挥越来越大的功能,固然那表示政坛务必吐弃当先5二%控制权。

India’s “promoters”, as the founders and owners of big businesses are
known, also need to be reined in further. Tycoons have the upper hand in
negotiations with their lenders because they know that red tape,
patronage and antiquated legal systems make it all but impossible to
seize the assets of defaulting firms. In effect, they cannot be replaced
at the helm. Resolving this imbalance would make it more likely that dud
loans are a headache for banks and borrowers, not for the finance
minister. It is good that  policymakers appear to be waking up to the
magnitude of India’s banking problem. Whether they appreciate the scale
of the solution is less clear

印度的“拉动者”,闻名海外的大商户创办者和主人,也须求更进一步被掌握控制。商业巨头们在与她们的贷款人谈判中占上风,因为他们领略官样小说,尊崇和过时的法度制度使得尚未恐怕获得违背合同公司的基金。实际上,它们不可能在掌舵处被沟通。化解那种不平衡后,不良贷款将令银行和借款人头痛不已,而不是财政省长的。政策制定者就像正在发现到孔雀之国银行题材的深重程度,那是好的地点。他们是还是不是清楚解决方案的局面还不是不行明了。

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